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Abstract
The issue of representing attacks to attacks in argumentation is receiving an
increasing attention as a useful conceptual modelling tool in several contexts.
In this paper we present AFRA, a formalism encompassing unlimited recursive
attacks within argumentation frameworks. AFRA satisfies the basic require-
ments of definition simplicity and rigorous compatibility with Dung’s theory of
argumentation. This paper provides a complete development of the AFRA for-
malism complemented by illustrative examples and a detailed comparison with
other recursive attack formalizations.
Keywords: Argumentation frameworks, Argumentation semantics, Argument
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1. Introduction
An argumentation framework (AF in the following), as introduced in the
seminal paper by Dung [1], is an abstract structure consisting of a set of ele-
ments, called arguments, whose origin, nature and possible internal organiza-
tion is not specified, and by a binary relation of attack on the set of arguments,
whose meaning is not specified either. This abstract formalism has been shown
to encompass a large variety of more specific formalisms in areas ranging from
nonmonotonic reasoning to logic programming and game theory, and, as such,
is widely regarded as a powerful tool for theoretical analysis. Several variations
of the original AF formalism have been proposed in the literature. On one
hand, some approaches enrich the original framework with additional concepts,
necessary to modelling in a “natural” way specific reasoning situations. This is
the case, for instance, of preference-based argumentation [2, 3], where a pref-
erence ordering among arguments is considered, of value-based argumentation
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[4], where a value is associated to arguments in order to account for the con-
cept of preference (an investigation on the relations between preference-based
and valued-based argumentation is given in [5]), of bipolar argumentation [6, 7],
where a relation of support between arguments is considered besides that of at-
tack, or of weighted argument systems [8], where a weight indicates the relative
strength of attacks. On the other hand, some proposals investigate generalized
versions of the original AF definition (in particular, of the notion of attack),
without introducing any additional concept within the basic scheme, as in [9–
11]. This paper lies in the latter line of investigation and pursues the goal of
generalizing the AF notion of attack by allowing an attack, starting from an ar-
gument, to be directed not just towards an argument but also towards any other
attack. This will be achieved by a recursive definition of the attack, that leads
to the proposal of a new framework called AFRA (Argumentation Framework
with Recursive Attacks).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the basic notions and
fundamental properties of Dung’s argumentation framework. Section 3 intro-
duces the definition of AFRA accompanied by a discussion of its motivations
and objectives. In particular, AFRA is required to parallel the semantics no-
tions of Dung’s theory and their fundamental properties while extending them to
recursive attacks in an intuitively plausible and formally simple way. Section 4
introduces the generalized version of the basic notions of defeat, conflict-free set,
acceptable argument, characteristic function, and admissible set showing that
the relevant requirements stated in Section 3 hold. Section 5 extends to AFRA
the definitions of complete, grounded, preferred, stable, semi-stable and ideal
semantics, showing that their required properties, paralleling the traditional
ones, hold. Sections 6 and 7 deal with further relationships between AFRA
and AF . The former shows that when an AFRA coincides with an AF (since
no attacks to attacks are present) all the generalized AFRA notions are fully
compatible with the original ones. In the latter a method to express an AFRA
as an AF is provided. Section 8 draws a detailed comparison of AFRA with
the related formalisms Extended Argumentation Framework (EAF ) and Higher
Order Argumentation Framework (HOAF). Finally Section 9 summarizes the
main contributions of the paper and discusses directions for future research.
2. Background notions
In Dung’s theory an argumentation framework (AF ) is a pair 〈A,→〉 where
A is a set of arguments and →⊆ A × A is a binary relation on it. The terse
intuition behind this formalism is that arguments may attack each other and
useful formal definitions and theoretical investigations may be built on this
simple basis. In particular, the notions recalled in Definition 1 lie at the heart
of the definitions of Dung’s argumentation semantics1, each of them representing
1The letter “D” prefixed to the terms introduced in Definitions 1 and 2 denotes that they
specifically refer to the Dung’s proposal.
2
a formal way of determining the conflict outcome [12].
Definition 1. Given an AF ∆ = 〈A,→〉:
• a set U ⊆ A is D-conflict-free if @A,B ∈ U s.t. (A,B) ∈→;
• an argument A ∈ A is D-acceptable with respect to a set U ⊆ A (or,
equivalently, is defended by U) if ∀B ∈ A s.t. (B,A) ∈→, ∃C ∈ U s.t.
(C,B) ∈→;
• the function F∆ : 2A → 2A such that F∆(U) = {A | A is D-acceptable w.r.t. U}
is called the D-characteristic function of ∆;
• a set U ⊆ A is D-admissible if U is D-conflict-free and every element of U
is D-acceptable with respect to U , i.e. U ⊆ F∆(U).
An argumentation semantics identifies for any argumentation framework a
set of extensions, namely sets of arguments which are “collectively acceptable”,
or, in other words, able to survive together the conflict represented by the attack
relation: for instance arguments that belong to all of extensions can be consid-
ered skeptically justified, while arguments belonging to at least an extension can
be considered credulously justified. We recall that while the grounded and ideal
semantics always identify a unique extension for a given argumentation frame-
work (called grounded and ideal extension, respectively), the preferred, stable,
and semi-stable semantics can identify several extensions (called preferred, sta-
ble, and semi-stable extensions, respectively)2.
Definition 2. Given an AF ∆ = 〈A,→〉:
• a set U ⊆ A is a D-complete extension if U is D-admissible and ∀A ∈ A
s.t. A is D-acceptable w.r.t. U , A ∈ U ;
• a set U ⊆ A is the D-grounded extension if U is the least (w.r.t. set
inclusion) fixed point3 of the D-characteristic function F∆;
• a set U ⊆ A is a D-preferred extension if U is a maximal (w.r.t. set
inclusion) D-admissible set;
• a set U ⊆ A is a D-stable extension if U is D-conflict-free and ∀A ∈ A\U ,
∃B ∈ U s.t. (B,A) ∈→;
• a set U ⊆ A is a D-semi-stable extension if U is a D-complete extension
with maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) D-range (given a set U ⊆ A, the D-
range of U , denoted as Drange(U), is U∪UD+ where UD+ = {A ∈ A|∃B ∈
U s.t. (B,A) ∈→});
2The reader is referred to [13, 14] for a detailed discussion and a comparison concerning
the different semantics proposed in the literature.
3It is shown in Theorem 25 of [1] that the grounded extension can be equivalently charac-
terized as the least D-complete extension.
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• a set U ⊆ A is the D-ideal extension if U is the maximal (w.r.t. set
inclusion) D-ideal set (a set U ⊆ A is D-ideal if it is D-admissible and ∀E
s.t. E is a D-preferred extension, U ⊆ E).
It is easy to note that any extension of the above semantics is a D-admissible
set, that is, it is able to defend all of its arguments (in the sense that arguments
are D-acceptable w.r.t. the extension itself). The notion of acceptability and
the related notion of admissibility are supported by intuition and satisfy a set
of fundamental properties which in turn entail several desirable consequences,
holding even in the infinite case, such as the existence of preferred extensions as
well as the existence and uniqueness of the grounded extension. These properties
are recalled in the following proposition [1].
Proposition 1. Given an AF ∆ = 〈A,→〉:
• the D-characteristic function preserves D-conflict-freeness, i.e. given a set
U ⊆ A, if U is D-conflict-free then also F∆(U) is D-conflict-free;
• the D-characteristic function is monotonic, i.e. if U1 ⊆ U2, then F∆(U1) ⊆
F∆(U2);
• Dung’s fundamental lemma: given a D-admissible set U ⊆ A and two
arguments A,A′ ∈ A that are D-acceptable w.r.t. U , it holds that U ′ =
U ∪ {A} is D-admissible and A′ is D-acceptable w.r.t. U ′;
• the set of all admissible sets form a complete partial order w.r.t. set
inclusion.
3. Motivations and requirements
In Dung’s theory, arguments are regarded as the only entities that may be
in conflict with each other and may be defeasible. The issue of extending the
framework in such a way as also attacks are allowed to feature these properties
has recently received significant attention in the literature. In fact, enabling
attacks to attacks and considering them defeasible turns out to provide a useful
and intuitively plausible formal counterpart to representation and reasoning
patterns commonly adopted in various contexts. For instance, an approach to
reasoning about preferences based on attacks to attacks has been introduced in
[9] and extensively developed in [11]. In [15, 16] attacks to attacks are considered
in the context of reasoning about coalitions, while in [17] attacks to attacks are
discussed in connection with the notions of strength, support and temporal
dynamics.
The present paper contributes to the research line on formalizing attacks to
attacks in argumentation by pursuing the following main objectives:
• encompassing an unrestricted recursive notion of attack to attack;
• keeping the proposed formalism as simple as possible;
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• encompassing Dung’s AF as a special case of the proposed formalism;
• ensuring compatibility between the semantics notions in the proposed for-
malism and those in Dung’s AF .
As to the first point, in some previous proposals (e.g. [9, 11]) only one level
of recursion is allowed, i.e. attacks attacking other attacks can not in turn be
attacked. While this choice may be justified in specific contexts (e.g. reasoning
about preferences), we aim at proposing a more general formalism which is able
to accommodate various kinds of representation and reasoning needs related
to recursive attacks. In particular, further levels of recursive attacks can be
considered in the area of modelling decision processes as shown by the following
example, which will be used throughout the paper to illustrate the main concepts
of the proposed approach.
Suppose Bob is deciding about his Christmas holidays and, as a general rule
of thumb, he is willing to buy cheap last minute offers. Suppose two such offers
are available, one for a week in Gstaad and another for a week in Cuba. Then,
using his behavioral rule, Bob can build two arguments, one, let say G, whose
premise is “There is a last minute offer for Gstaad” and whose conclusion is “I
should go to Gstaad”, the other, let say C, whose premise is “There is a last
minute offer for Cuba” and whose conclusion is “I should go to Cuba”. As the
two choices are incompatible, G and C attack each other, a situation giving
rise to an undetermined choice. Suppose however that Bob has a preference
P for skiing and knows that Gstaad is a renowned ski resort. The point now
is: how can we represent this preference? P might be represented implicitly by
suppressing the attack from C to G, but this is unsatisfactory, since it would
prevent further reasoning on P , as described below. So let us consider P as
an argument whose premise is “Bob likes skiing” and whose conclusion is “If
possible, Bob prefers a ski resort”. P might then attack C, but this would not
be sound since P is not actually in contrast with the existence of a good last
minute offer for Cuba and the fact that, according to Bob’s general behavioral
rule, this provides him with a good reason for going to Cuba. Thus, following
[11], it seems more reasonable to represent P as attacking the attack from C to
G, causing G to prevail. Note that the attack from C to G is not suppressed,
but only made ineffective, in the specific situation at hand, due to the attack of
P .
Assume now that Bob learns that there have been no snowfalls in Gstaad
since one month and from this fact he derives that it might not be possible to
ski there. This argument (N), whose premise is “The weather report informs
that in Gstaad there were no snowfalls since one month” and whose conclusion
is “It is not possible to ski in Gstaad”, does not affect neither the existence
of last minute offers for Gstaad nor Bob’s general preference for ski, rather it
affects the ability of this preference to affect the choice between Gstaad and
Cuba. Thus argument N attacks the attack originated from P .
Suppose finally that eventually Bob is informed that in Gstaad it is anyway
possible to ski, thanks to a good amount of artificial snow. This leads to building
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an argument, let say A, which attacks N , thus in turn reinstating the attack
originated from P and intuitively supporting the choice of Gstaad. A graphical
illustration of this example is provided in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Bob’s last minute dilemma.
As pointed out by one of the reviewers of this paper, alternative formaliza-
tions of this example not involving attacks to attacks are possible. For instance,
from the general preference for skiing, represented in the example by argument
P , one might derive a distinct and more specific argument P ′ representing the
preference for Gstaad over Cuba. In this case argument P ′ (instead of P ) would
attack β through γ and argument N would attack P ′ (instead of γ) through δ.
Of course, the representation adopted for this example – like any formal repre-
sentation of a real situation – is a matter of modelling choice. In general, we
do not claim that there are indisputable, theoretical reasons for asserting that
recursive attacks are strictly necessary. Indeed, technically speaking, extended
argumentation frameworks encompassing attacks to attacks do not feature an
augmented expressive power with respect to Dung’s formalism, as they can be
translated into traditional argumentation frameworks, as shown for instance in
[11] and in Section 7 of the present paper. From a modelling point of view, how-
ever, it can be observed that attacks to attacks offer a useful tool supporting a
natural representation of some reasoning patterns.
Figure 2: The EAF for the weather forecast example (Fig. 3 in [11]).
As a further example, consider the case presented in [11] concerning two
agents P and Q exchanging arguments about weather forecasts (see Figure 2).
Argument A, asserted by agent P, can be synthesized as “Today will be dry
in London since the BBC forecast sunshine”, while agent Q asserts argument
B “Today will be wet in London since CNN forecast rain”. Arguments A and
B have contradictory conclusions and therefore attack each other. Preferences
may then be expressed by P and Q in order to resolve this undecided situation.
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For instance P may state an argument C “But the BBC are more trustworthy
than CNN”, which expresses a preference for BBC, while Q may reply with an
argument C′ “However, statistically CNN are more accurate forecasters than the
BBC” expressing a preference for CNN. The two conflicting preferences attack
each other and, according to the preference modeling adopted in [11], C attacks
the attack from B to A, while C′ attacks the attack from A to B. Agent Q may
then state an argument E asserting that “Basing a comparison on statistics is
more rigorous and rational than basing a comparison on your instincts about
their relative trustworthiness”. As argumentE expresses a preference for C′ over
C, E attacks the attack from C to C′. Now, in order to see how recursive attacks
may play a role in this context, consider the following additional argument F
asserted by P: “However, BBC has recently changed its whether forecast model,
no information on the new model is available; therefore statistics on CNN loses
prevalence over personal opinion about BBC”. F does not attack neither C′ that
states the preference for CNN’s weather forecast over BBC’s one based upon
statistics, nor E, which states the general principle that basing a comparison on
statistics is more rigorous and rational than basing a comparison on instincts.
Obviously, it does not attack neither C, nor A, nor B. In fact, F attacks the
assumption that E affects the attacks between C and C′: while it is generally
accepted that basing a comparison on statistics is more rigorous that basing
a comparison on personal intuition, in the case at hand, existing statistics are
not decisive for a comparison between the accuracy of CNN and BBC forecasts.
In other words F provides a good reason for believing that E does not attack
the attack from C′ to C and this can be modelled as an attack from F to the
attack originating from E. Therefore the situation remains undecided and both
attacks between A and B are still in force.
Given the kind of representation needs illustrated above, we pursue the sec-
ond and third objectives stated above by introducing in a rather straightforward
way the fundamental definition of our proposal, namely the concept of argumen-
tation framework with recursive attacks.
Definition 3 (AFRA). An Argumentation Framework with Recursive Attacks
(AFRA) is a pair 〈A,R〉 where:
• A is a set of arguments;
• R is a set of attacks, namely pairs (A,X ) s.t. A ∈ A and (X ∈ R or
X ∈ A).
Given an attack α = (A,X ) ∈ R, we say that A is the source of α, denoted as
src(α) = A and X is the target of α, denoted as trg(α) = X .
When useful, we will denote an attack to attack explicitly showing all the
recursive steps implied by its definition; for instance (A, (B,C)) means (A,α)
where α = (B,C).
The formalization of Bob’s last minute dilemma in terms of AFRA gives a
simple illustration of the use of the formalism.
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Example 1 (Bob’s last minute dilemma). Let ΓBob = 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA
where: A = {C, G, P, N, A} and R = {α, β, γ, δ, }, with α = (G,C),
β = (C,G), γ = (P, β), δ = (N, γ),  = (A,N).
As to our third objective, it can be noted that an AFRA is also an AF when
R does not include pairs (A,X ) such that X ∈ R.
The fourth high-level objective of “compatibility” concerns the AFRA se-
mantics notions which will be introduced in Sections 4 and 5. The underlying
idea is that the basic concepts of conflict-freeness, acceptability, admissibility
and the various proposals of extension-based semantics are formally introduced
in the context of AFRA, by explicitly considering both arguments and attacks.
We remark in particular that, according to Definition 3, we regard attacks as
entities which are rooted in arguments and, as a consequence, we require that
their inclusion in an extension is possible only in case of inclusion of their source
argument too. This choice ensures preservation of the main lines of Dung’s well-
established conceptual framework for semantics definition, while anyway reflect-
ing the extended (in a sense, empowered) role ascribed to attacks in AFRA, in
particular their defeasibility.
From a more formal perspective, the objective of “compatibility” leads to
the following requirements:
• the fundamental properties listed in Proposition 1 should still hold for the
parallel concepts introduced in the context of AFRA;
• in the case where an AFRA is also an AF , a bijective correspondence
between the semantics notions according to the two formalisms should
hold.
The definition of semantics notions for AFRA in accordance with the ob-
jectives discussed above is carried out in Sections 4 and 5.
4. Basic semantic notions for AFRA
4.1. Defeat and conflict-free sets
As a starting point for the definition of any semantics-related notion we
consider the concept of defeat. According to the role played by attacks in AFRA
we introduce a notion of direct defeat which regards attacks, rather than their
source arguments, as the subjects able to defeat arguments or other attacks.
This is also coherent with the fact that an attack can be made ineffective by
attacking the attack itself rather than its source.
Definition 4 (Direct Defeat). Let 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA, α ∈ R, V ∈ A∪R: α
directly defeats V iff V = trg(α).
Moreover, according to the idea that an attack is strictly related to its source,
we introduce a notion of indirect defeat for an attack, corresponding to the
situation where its source receives a direct defeat.
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Definition 5 (Indirect Defeat). Let 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA and α, β ∈ R: if α
directly defeats src(β) then α indirectly defeats β.
Example 1 (continued). In ΓBob there are the following direct and indirect
defeats: α directly defeats C; α indirectly defeats β; β directly defeats G; β
indirectly defeats α; γ directly defeats β; δ directly defeats γ;  directly defeats
N ;  indirectly defeats δ.
As a special, but significant, situation note that in case of a self-attacking
argument, exemplified by the AFRA 〈{A}, {α}〉 with α = (A,A), α directly
defeats A and indirectly defeats itself.
Summing up, a defeat is either a direct or indirect defeat.
Definition 6 (Defeat). Let 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA, α ∈ R, V ∈ A∪R: α defeats
V , denoted as α→R V , iff α directly or indirectly defeats V .
The definition of conflict-free set follows directly, requiring the absence of
defeats.
Definition 7 (Conflict–free set). Let 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA, S ⊆ A ∪ R is
conflict–free iff @V ,W ∈ S s.t. V →R W .
The definition of conflict-free set for AFRA is formally quite similar to the
corresponding one in AF but they feature substantial differences. A first one,
which is quite evident and common to other AFRA notions, concerns the fact
that a set of arguments and attacks, rather than just a set of arguments is
considered. A slightly subtler one, related to the underlying notion of defeat,
consists in the fact that in AFRA every set of arguments U ⊆ A is conflict-
free, since only the explicit consideration of attacks gives rise to conflict in this
approach. While this may sound peculiar according to the “traditional” view, it
is again coherent with the central role played by attacks and, as it will be seen
later, does not prevent (indeed it enables) the achievement of the compatibility
requirement with AF .
Example 1 (continued). Consider S1 = {G,C}: as explained above, S1 is
conflict-free as it does not explicitly include any attack. On the other hand,
the sets S2 = {G,C, α}, S3 = {G,C, β}, S4 = {G,C, α, β} are not conflict-free.
Note also that Definition 7 encompasses sets consisting of attacks only. For
instance the set S5 = {α, β} is not conflict-free since α →R β (α indirectly
defeats β) and, analogously, β →R α.
4.2. Acceptability and characteristic function
The definition of acceptability is formally very similar to the traditional one,
apart from the fact of encompassing sets of both arguments and attacks.
Definition 8 (Acceptability). Let 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA, S ⊆ A ∪ R and W ∈
A ∪R: W is acceptable w.r.t. S (or, equivalently is defended by S) iff ∀α ∈ R
s.t. α→R W ∃β ∈ S s.t. β →R α.
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Note that while acceptability is defined with reference to a set S possibly
including both arguments and attacks, only attacks are “effective” as far as
acceptability is concerned. In fact it is easy to see that an element (either
argument or attack) is acceptable w.r.t. a set S if and only if it is acceptable
w.r.t. to S ∩ R.
Example 1 (continued). Considering ΓBob, it can be seen that G is acceptable
w.r.t. {γ} and w.r.t. {α}, while it is not acceptable w.r.t. {P}. As other
examples, β is acceptable w.r.t. {δ}, and γ is acceptable w.r.t. {}.
Lemma 1 shows that the acceptability of an attack implies the acceptability
of its source, in accordance with the requirements mentioned in Section 3.
Lemma 1. Let 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA and S ⊆ A ∪ R. If an attack α ∈ R is
acceptable w.r.t S, then src(α) is acceptable w.r.t to S.
Proof. Suppose src(α) = A is not acceptable w.r.t. S. Then, ∃β s.t. β →R A
and @γ ∈ S s.t. γ →R β. But since β →R A and A = src(α), then β →R α;
therefore α is not acceptable w.r.t. S. Contradiction.
The definition of characteristic function parallels the traditional one.
Definition 9. The characteristic function FΓ of an AFRA Γ = 〈A,R〉 is defined
as follows:
FΓ : 2
A∪R 7→ 2A∪R
FΓ(S) = {V |V is acceptable w.r.t. S}
Propositions 2 and 3 show that the fundamental properties of preserving
conflict-freeness and being monotonic hold for the AFRA characteristic func-
tion, as required.
Proposition 2. Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA. If S ⊆ A ∪ R is conflict-free,
then FΓ(S) is also conflict-free.
Proof. Assume that there are α and V in FΓ(S) such that α →R V . By the
acceptability of V , there exists β ∈ S s.t. β →R α. Then, by the acceptability
of α there is β′ ∈ S s.t. β′ →R β, contradicting the hypothesis that S is
conflict-free. Therefore FΓ(S) is conflict-free.
Proposition 3. Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA. The Function FΓ is monotonic
w.r.t. set inclusion.
Proof. Letting S ⊆ S ′ ⊆ (A ∪ R), we have to show that FΓ(S) ⊆ FΓ(S ′), i.e.
that every V which is acceptable w.r.t. S is acceptable w.r.t. S ′. Suppose that
V is acceptable w.r.t. S but not w.r.t. S ′. Then, ∃α ∈ R s.t. α →R V and
@β ∈ S ′ s.t. β →R α, which, since S ⊆ S ′, implies @β ∈ S s.t. β →R α, which
contradicts the hypothesis that V is acceptable w.r.t. S.
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4.3. Admissibility
The definition of admissible sets in AFRA requires conflict-freeness and
acceptability of all set elements, exactly as in AF .
Definition 10 (Admissibility). Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA: S ⊆ A ∪ R is
admissible iff it is conflict–free and each element of S is acceptable w.r.t. S (i.e.
S ⊆ FΓ(S)).
As required, a parallel of Dung’s fundamental lemma holds in the context of
AFRA.
Lemma 2 (Fundamental lemma). Let 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA, S ⊆ A ∪ R an
admissible set and V ,V ′ ∈ A ∪R elements acceptable w.r.t. S. Then:
1. S ′ = S ∪ {V } is admissible; and
2. V ′ is acceptable w.r.t. S ′.
Proof.
1. V is acceptable w.r.t. S therefore each element of S ′ is acceptable w.r.t.
S ′. Suppose S ′ is not conflict–free; therefore there exists an element W ∈
S such that either V →R W or W →R V . From the admissibility of
S and the acceptability of V there exists an element W¯ ∈ S such that
W¯ →R W or W¯ →R V . Since S is conflict–free it follows that W¯ →R V .
But then from the acceptability of V there must exist an element Wˆ ∈ S
such that Wˆ →R W¯ . Contradiction.
2. Immediate from Proposition 3.
The following theorem completes the verification that AFRA satisfies all the
fundamental properties of Dung’s theory listed in Proposition 1.
Theorem 1. Let Γ be an AFRA. The set of all admissible sets of Γ forms a
complete partial order with respect to set inclusion.
Proof. We have to prove that (i) the set of all admissible sets has a least ele-
ment and (ii) each chain of admissible sets has a least upper bound. Point (i)
immediately follows from the fact that the empty set is admissible, therefore it
is obvioulsy the least element. As for (ii), let Ω be a chain of admissible sets: we
prove that S =
⋃
ω∈Ω ω is admissible, thus obviously a least upper bound of Ω.
First, S is conflict-free, otherwise ∃U ,V ∈ S such that U →R V , entailing that
∃ω ∈ Ω such that U ,V ∈ ω and contradicting the admissibility of ω. Second,
suppose that U ∈ S and V →R U : we have to prove that ∃W ∈ S such that
W →R V . The conclusion follows from the fact that ∃ω ∈ Ω such that U ∈ ω,
and since ω is admissible ∃W ∈ ω ⊆ S such that W →R V .
Example 1 (continued). In ΓBob there are fourty admissible sets, denoted in
the following as ASi. First observe that according to Definition 10 the empty
set is admissible for any AFRA, thus we have AS1 = ∅. As to sets consist-
ing of arguments only, note that only unattacked arguments can be admissible
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by themselves since in AFRA defense is carried out by attack elements (for in-
stance G requires α for its defense). Thus we have AS2 = {P}, AS3 = {A}, and
of course their union AS6 = {A, P} (the adopted numbering is in accordance
with Figure 3). Also singletons consisting of (directly or indirectly) unattacked
attacks and those able to defend themselves on their own are of course admis-
sible, yielding AS4 = {α} and AS5 = {} (note for instance that δ is indirectly
defeated by  and it does not defend itself). Of course any set including only
these individually admissible elements is admissible too, giving rise to 11 further
admissible sets: AS6 = {A, P}, AS9 = {P, }, AS10 = {A, }, AS11 = {P,
α}, AS12 = {A, α}, AS13 = {, α}, AS14 = {P, , α}, AS15 = {A, , α},
AS20 = {A, P, α}, AS21 = {A, P, }, AS34 = {A, P, , α}.
Considering now defense by individually admissible attacks we note that 
defends γ by indirectly defeating δ and α defends G by indirectly defeating β,
leading to AS7 = {, γ}, AS8 = {G, α}. Of course the union of these two sets,
being conflict-free, is admissible too, leading to AS32 = {G, , γ, α}. Adding
other unattacked elements to any of these three sets preserves admissibility,
leading to the following 14 admissible sets: AS16 = {G, , α}, AS17 = {P, G,
α}, AS18 = {A, G, α}, AS22 = {P, , γ}, AS23 = {A, , γ}, AS24 = {, γ, α},
AS25 = {P, G, , α}, AS26 = {A, G, , α}, AS33 = {A, P, G, α}, AS27 = {A,
P, , γ}, AS31 = {A, , γ, α}, AS30 = {P, , γ, α}. AS37 = {A, P, , γ, α},
AS39 = {A, P, G, , α}.
Since γ, being defended by , in turn defends G by directly defeating β, the
set AS19 = {G, , γ} is admissible. Again, adding unattacked elements gives
rise to the following 6 further admissible sets: AS28 = {P, G, , γ}, AS29 = {A,
G, , γ}, AS35 = {P, G, , γ, α}, AS36 = {A, G, , γ, α}, AS38 = {A, P, G, ,
γ}, AS40 = {A, P, G, , γ, α}.
Figure 3 shows the Hasse diagram (w.r.t. set inclusion) of the admissible
sets listed above. Coherently with Theorem 1 this is a complete partial order
with the empty set as minimal element at the bottom (as for any AFRA and
for any AF ) and (at least) one maximal admissible set, namely AS40.
5. Semantics for AFRA
In this section we define and analyse the AFRA semantics corresponding to
the ones listed in Definition 2.
5.1. Complete Semantics
The notion of complete extension closely parallels the traditional one by
requiring admissibility and the inclusion of any acceptable argument.
Definition 11 (Complete extension). Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA. A set
S ⊆ A ∪ R is a complete extension if and only if S is admissible and every
element of A ∪R which is acceptable w.r.t. S belongs to S, i.e. FΓ(S) ⊆ S.
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Figure 3: Hasse diagram of admissible sets for Example 1.
By inspection of Definitions 10 and 11 it is immediate to see that a complete
extension can be equivalently characterized as a conflict-free set S which is a
fixed point of FΓ, i.e. such that FΓ(S) = S.
Example 1 (continued). In ΓBob there is exactly one complete extension: {A,
P, G, , γ, α}.
We introduce also a more articulated AFRA (shown in Figure 4) which will
be useful for illustration and comparison of the semantics to be introduced in
the following.
Example 2. Let Γ̂ = 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA, where: A = {A, B, C, D, E,
F, G}, and R = {α, β, γ, δ, , η, ζ, θ, ι, κ} with α = (A,B), β = (B,α),
γ = (C,α), δ = (C,D),  = (E, δ), η = (D, ), ζ = (A,F ), θ = (F,A),
ι = (F,G), κ = (G,G).
As to the complete extensions of Γ̂, note first that the unattacked elements
are E, C and γ and that γ defends both B and β by directly defeating α. It
follows that {B, C, E, β, γ} is a complete extension. Further note that θ defends
itself, F and ι by indirectly defeating ζ and, analogously, ζ defends itself and
A by indirectly defeating θ. This gives rise to two further complete extensions,
namely {B, C, E, F, β, γ, θ, ι} and {A, B, C, E, β, γ, ζ}. All other arguments
and attacks in Γ̂ have no defense and hence do not belong to any admissible set
or complete extension.
5.2. Grounded Semantics
The definition of grounded semantics parallels Dung’s one: as in his ap-
proach, the basic properties of the characteristic function (whose validity we
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Figure 4: Graphical representation of Example 2.
have already proved also in the context of AFRA) ensure the uniqueness of the
grounded extension and the fact that it can be equivalently characterized as the
least complete extension.
Definition 12 (Grounded extension). Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA. The
grounded extension of Γ is the least fixed point of FΓ.
Lemma 3. The grounded extension is the least complete extension.
The identification of the grounded extension in Examples 1 and 2 follows
easily.
Example 1 (continued). The grounded extension of ΓBob is {A, P, G, , γ, α}.
Example 2 (continued). The grounded extension of Γ̂ is {B, C, E, β, γ}.
5.3. Preferred semantics
As expected, preferred extensions are defined as maximal admissible sets.
Definition 13 (Preferred extension). Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA. A set
S ⊆ A∪R is a preferred extension of Γ iff it is a maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion)
admissible set.
Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 follow directly from Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA. For each admissible set S of Γ,
there exists a preferred extension E of Γ such that S ⊆ E .
Corollary 1. Every AFRA possesses at least one preferred extension.
It also holds that preferred extensions are complete (and hence can be equiv-
alently characterized as maximal complete extensions).
Lemma 4. Every preferred extension is a complete extension, but not vice
versa.
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Proof. Let S be a preferred extension which is not complete, then ∃V /∈ S which
is acceptable w.r.t. S and by the fundamental lemma (Lemma 2) S ∪ {V } is
admissible: but this contradicts the maximality of S. As to the other point, in
Example 2 one of the complete extensions is not preferred (see below).
Maximal complete extensions are easily identified in Examples 1 and 2.
Example 1 (continued). In ΓBob the only preferred extension is the grounded
extension, i.e. {A, P, G, , γ, α}.
Example 2 (continued). The preferred extensions of Γ̂ are {B, C, E, F, β, γ,
θ, ι} and {A, B, C, E, β, γ, ζ}, while the complete (and grounded) extension
{B, C, E, β, γ} is not preferred since it is not maximal w.r.t. set inclusion.
5.4. Stable semantics
Stable semantics is based, as usual, on the idea that each extension attacks
all elements not included in it.
Definition 14 (Stable extension). Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA. A set S ⊆
A ∪ R is a stable extension of Γ if and only if S is conflict-free and ∀V ∈
A ∪R,V /∈ S, ∃α ∈ S s.t. α→R V .
Stable extensions are also preferred, but not vice versa. In particular, as in
AF , there are cases where no extensions complying with Definition 14 exist.
Lemma 5. Every stable extension is a preferred extension, but not vice versa.
Proof. It is easy to see that each stable extension is a maximal complete ex-
tension, hence a preferred extension. To show that the reverse does not hold,
consider an AFRA consisting just of a self-defeating argument: Γ = 〈A,R〉
with A = {A}, R = {(A,A)}. The empty set is a preferred extension of Γ but
clearly is not stable.
Example 1 (continued). The only stable extension of ΓBob is {A, P, G, , γ,
α}.
Example 2 (continued). The two preferred extensions of Γ̂ are not stable. In
particular neither of them includes nor defeats the elements δ, , η, and D.
5.5. Semi-stable semantics
Semi-stable semantics [18] is based on the idea of prescribing the maximiza-
tion of both the arguments included in an extension and those attacked by it,
i.e. of maximizing the extension range.
Definition 15 (Range). Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA and let S ⊆ A∪R be a
set of arguments and attacks. The range of S, denoted as range(S), is defined
as S ∪ S+ where S+ = {V ∈ A ∪R|∃α ∈ S s.t. α→R V }.
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Definition 16 (Semi-stable extension). Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA, a set
S ⊆ A∪R is a semi-stable extension iff S is a complete extension with maximal
(w.r.t set inclusion) range.
Proposition 4 summarizes the relations of semi-stable with stable and pre-
ferred semantics in AFRA, paralleling those holding in AF .
Proposition 4. For any AFRA Γ = 〈A,R〉
1. if stable extensions exist, then they coincide with semi-stable extensions;
2. every semi-stable extension is preferred but not viceversa.
Proof. As to the first point, note that, by definition, the range of any stable
extension coincides with A ∪ R, which is of course the largest possible one.
Moreover stable extensions are admissible sets by Lemma 5, hence the conclu-
sion. As to the second point, suppose a semi-stable extension S is not preferred,
i.e. there is an admissible set S ′ strictly including it: the range of S ′ strictly
includes the range of S, contradicting the hypothesis that S is a semi-stable
extension. On the other hand there are preferred extensions which are not
semi-stable as in Example 2 (see below).
Example 1 (continued). The only semi-stable extension of ΓBob is {A, P, G,
, γ, α}.
Example 2 (continued). Consider the preferred extensions of Γ̂. Letting S =
{B, C, E, F, β, γ, θ, ι} it holds S+ = {G,A, α, ζ, κ}. On the other hand letting
S∗ = {A, B, C, E, β, γ, ζ} it holds S+∗ = {F, α, θ, ι}. S is the only semi-stable
extension of Γ̂ since (S ∪ S+) ) (S∗ ∪ S+∗ ).
5.6. Ideal semantics
Ideal semantics [19] considers the largest admissible set included in all pre-
ferred extensions.
Definition 17 (Ideal extension). Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA. A set S ⊆ A∪R
is ideal iff S is admissible and ∀Π s.t. Π is a preferred extension of Γ, S ⊆ Π.
The ideal extension is the maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) ideal set.
Definition 17 anticipates the uniqueness of ideal extension shown in the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 5. The ideal extension is unique.
Proof. Suppose that there are two distinct maximal ideal sets S and S ′ comply-
ing with Definition 17. Now S ∪ S ′ is included in all the preferred extensions,
hence it is conflict-free, and defends all its elements, hence it is also admissi-
ble. Therefore S ∪ S ′ is a larger ideal set than S and S ′, contradicting the
hypothesis.
It can also be seen that the ideal extension includes all acceptable elements,
i.e. it is a complete extension.
16
Lemma 6. The ideal extension is a complete extension.
Proof. The ideal extension is admissible by definition, thus it is sufficient to
show that it includes any element V which is acceptable w.r.t. it. Since the
ideal extension is contained in any preferred extension, it is easy to see that
V is acceptable w.r.t any preferred extension too. By Lemma 4 the preferred
extensions are also complete, therefore they must all include V . As a conse-
quence, V is included in the ideal extension, otherwise including it would give
rise by the fundamental lemma (Lemma 2) to a strictly greater admissible set
contained in all preferred extensions, contradicting the maximality of the ideal
extension.
Since the grounded extension is included in all complete extensions (and
hence in all preferred extensions) and is admissible, the ideal extension is a
(possibly strict) superset of the grounded extension.
Example 1 (continued). The ideal extension of ΓBob is {A, P, G, , γ, α}.
Example 2 (continued). The ideal extension of Γ̂ is {B, C, E, β, γ}.
6. Compatibility with AF
In this section we prove the satisfaction of the compatibility requirement
formally stated at the end of Section 3 for the case where a given AFRA is
an AF . To be precise, throughout this section when stating “let Γ = 〈A,R〉
be an AF”, we will consider that Γ is an AFRA such that attacks involve
just arguments rather than being directed against other attacks (formally, R ⊆
A×A).
First of all, it is easy to see that, in this case, a dual property holds w.r.t.
Lemma 1.
Lemma 7. Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AF and S ⊆ (A∪R). If an argument A ∈ A
is acceptable w.r.t. S, then any α ∈ R such that src(α) = A is acceptable w.r.t.
S.
Proof. We prove that α is defended by S from any attack. For any β such that
β →R α, β does not directly attack α since 〈A,R〉 is an AF . As a consequence,
it must be the case that β →R src(α), i.e. β →R A: since A is acceptable w.r.t.
S, then ∃γ ∈ S s.t. γ →R β.
As anticipated above, we show that in the case of an AF the semantics de-
fined in Section 5 reduce to those adopted in the context of the traditional
Dung’s framework. Of course, this correspondence can only be established
through a mapping, since extensions in AFRA, differently from those in the tra-
ditional Dung’s framework, include both arguments and attacks. Accordingly,
Definition 18 provides a natural way to extend sets of arguments (corresponding
to traditional extensions) into sets of arguments and attacks (corresponding to
AFRA extensions).
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Definition 18 (→ AFRA operator). Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA. Given a
set of arguments U ⊆ A, U→AFRA , U ∪ {α ∈ R | src(α) ∈ U}.
In words, given a set of arguments U ⊆ A, the→ AFRA operator completes
U with all of the attacks arising from it. This operator will play a key role
in proving the satisfaction of compatibility requirements for all the considered
semantics (Propositions 6-11). In fact, given a semantics Σ, the compatibility
requirement (in the case where a given AFRA is an AF ) will be expressed
as a bijective correspondence, through the → AFRA operator, between (i)
extensions prescribed by Σ in the traditional AF formulation, and (ii) extensions
prescribed by Σ in the AFRA formulation. More specifically, we will show for
each semantics Σ that if a set of arguments U is an AF extension according
to Σ then U→AFRA is an AFRA extension according to Σ and, vice versa, if
a set of arguments and attacks S is an AFRA extension according to Σ then
there is a set of arguments U such that S = U→AFRA and U is an AF extension
according to Σ.
The use of the → AFRA operator to prove these correspondences is sup-
ported by Lemmata 1 and 7. The relevant properties shown in Lemma 8 will
be exploited in the following.
Lemma 8. Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA, and let U1,U2 ⊆ A two sets of
arguments. It holds that:
1. U1 ⊆ U2 iff U1
→AFRA ⊆ U2
→AFRA
2. U1 ( U2 iff U1
→AFRA ( U2
→AFRA
3. U1
→AFRA ∪ U2
→AFRA = (U1 ∪ U2)
→AFRA
Proof.
1. As for the ⇒ direction, let V ∈ U1
→AFRA. If V is an argument then
by definition V ∈ U1 ⊆ U2 thus V also belongs to U2
→AFRA. In the
other case V ∈ R and by definition ∃A ∈ U1 : A = src(V ), thus A ∈ U2
and, again by definition, V ∈ U2
→AFRA. As for the other direction, if an
argument A ∈ U1 then it belongs to U1
→AFRA ⊆ U2
→AFRA, and since it
is an argument then it must be the case that A ∈ U2.
2. Taking into account the previous point, for the ⇒ direction we have just
to show that, considering an argument A ∈ U2 such that A /∈ U1, it
holds by definition that A ∈ U2
→AFRA but A /∈ U2
→AFRA, entailing that
U1
→AFRA ( U2
→AFRA. As for the other direction, by the hypothesis
∃V ∈ U2
→AFRA : V /∈ U1
→AFRA. If V is an argument then by definition
V ∈ U2 and V /∈ U1, if V ∈ R then these conditions hold for src(V ): in
any case, U1 ( U2.
3. V ∈ (U1
→AFRA ∪ U2
→AFRA) ⇔ V ∈ U1
→AFRA or V ∈ U2
→AFRA ⇔
V ∈ U1 ∨ ∃A ∈ U1 : A = src(V ) ∨ V ∈ U2 ∨ ∃B ∈ U2 : B = src(V ) ⇔
V ∈ (U1 ∪ U2) ∨ ∃C ∈ (U1 ∪ U2) : C = src(V ) ⇔ V ∈ (U1 ∪ U2)
→AFRA
.
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A key role in proving the satisfaction of the compatibility requirement is
played by showing in Proposition 6 that the desired bijective correspondence
between AFRA and AF extensions holds for the case of complete semantics.
Proposition 6. Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AF . Then, S is a complete extension of
Γ iff S = U→AFRA where U is a D-complete extension of Γ.
Proof. ⇒. We first show that S = (S ∩ A)→AFRA. In fact, for any V ∈ S if
V ∈ A then it obviously belongs to (S ∩A)→AFRA. In the other case, namely
V ∈ R, V is acceptable w.r.t. S since it belongs to S which is a complete
extension, thus by Lemma 1 src(V ) ∈ (S ∩ A), which by definition of the
→ AFRA operator entails V ∈ (S ∩ A)→AFRA. On the other hand, for any
V ∈ (S ∩ A)→AFRA if V ∈ A then it obviously belongs to S; in the other case
src(V ) ∈ S and V ∈ S follows from Lemma 7 and the fact that S is a complete
extension.
According to this result, we have to show that (S∩A) is a D-complete extension.
First, (S∩A) is D-conflict-free, otherwise there would exist A,B ∈ (S ∩A) with
(A,B) ∈→, i.e. letting α = (A,B) we would have α →R B with src(α) = A:
since both B and α belong to S = (S ∩A)→AFRA, S would not be conflict-free,
contradicting the hypothesis.
Then, we show that (S∩A) is D-admissible, i.e. givenA ∈ (S∩A), for anyB ∈ A
such that (B,A) ∈→ ∃C ∈ (S ∩ A) such that (C,B) ∈→. Since (B,A) ∈→,
letting α = (B,A) yields α →R A with src(α) = B. Since A ∈ S and S is
admissible by the hypothesis, ∃β ∈ S : β →R α, which taking into account that
Γ is an AF yields β →R B. Since β ∈ S = (S ∩ A)
→AFRA
, src(β) ∈ S, and the
thesis follows from (src(β), B) ∈→.
Finally, we prove that (S ∩ A) is D-complete by showing that, for any A ∈ A
which is D-acceptable w.r.t. (S∩A), A is acceptable w.r.t. S: by the hypothesis
that S is a complete extension it then follows that A ∈ S, i.e. A ∈ (S ∩ A).
Let us then consider an attack α ∈ R such that α →R A. Obviously this
is equivalent to (src(α), A) ∈→, and since A is D-acceptable w.r.t. (S ∩ A),
∃B ∈ (S ∩A) : (B, src(α)) ∈→. Letting β = (B, src(α)), we have β →R α, and
since B ∈ (S ∩ A) then also β ∈ S = (S ∩ A)→AFRA. Summing up, for any
α ∈ R such that α→R A ∃β ∈ S such that β →R α.
⇐. We have to show that U→AFRA is a complete extension, namely conflict-
free, admissible and including all acceptable elements.
As to the first point, assume by contradiction that ∃α,V ∈ U→AFRA such that
α →R V . While α ∈ R by definition, V either belongs to A or to R. In the
first case we have (src(α),V ) ∈→, and by definition of U→AFRA both src(α)
and V belong to U , contradicting the fact that U is D-conflict-free. In the
other case, i.e. V is an attack, since Γ is an AF we have α →R src(V ), i.e.
(src(α), src(V )) ∈→. But α,V ∈ U→AFRA entails src(α), src(V ) ∈ U , again
contradicting the fact that U is D-conflict-free.
To show that U→AFRA is admissible, consider a generic V ∈ U→AFRA and
suppose that ∃α ∈ R such that α →R V . Taking into account that Γ is
an AF and that by definition U→AFRA includes the sources of all the attacks
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it includes, it is easy to see that ∃A ∈ U such that α →R A (where A is
either V or src(V )). Therefore (src(α), A) ∈→, and since U is D-admissible
∃B ∈ U : (B, src(α)) ∈→. Letting β = (B, src(α)), we have β →R α and by
definition of U→AFRA it is the case that β ∈ U→AFRA.
Finally, we have to show that if V is acceptable w.r.t. U→AFRA then V ∈
U→AFRA. If V is an argument, taking into account that Γ is an AF , the
conclusion follows from the D-completeness of U . If V is an attack, we prove
that src(V ) is D-acceptable w.r.t. U , which, taking into account that U is a
D-complete extension, implies that src(V ) ∈ U , in turn entailing V ∈ U→AFRA
by the definition of U→AFRA. Thus, assume that there is A ∈ A such that
(A, src(V )) ∈→. Letting α = (A, src(V )), α →R V and since V is acceptable
w.r.t. U→AFRA which is admissible by the previous point, there is β ∈ U→AFRA
such that β →R α. Since Γ is an AF it must be the case that β →R A, obviously
entailing that (src(β), A) ∈→ with src(β) ∈ U by the definition of U→AFRA.
To exemplify this correspondence, consider the following example graphically
represented in Figure 5.
Example 3. Let Γ = 〈{A,B,C,D}, {α, β, γ, δ, , ζ}〉 be an AFRA where: α =
(A,B), β = (B,A), γ = (A,C), δ = (B,C),  = (C,D), ζ = (D,C). Γ is clearly
also an AF . The D-complete extensions of Γ are ∅, {D}, {A,D}, {B,D} while
the complete extensions (as defined in AFRA) are ∅, {D, ζ}, {A,D, α, γ, ζ},
{B,D, β, δ, ζ}. It is easy to see that any D-complete extension can be extended
to a corresponding complete extension adding the attacks that arise from it
(through the → AFRA operator) and, conversely, that any complete exten-
sion corresponds to a D-complete extension if we consider only the arguments
included in it.
Figure 5: Graphical representation of Example 3.
This result can be extended to prove an analogous correspondence between
the preferred and the D-preferred extensions, the grounded and the D-grounded
extension, as well as the stable and the D-stable extensions.
Proposition 7. Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AF . Then, S is a preferred extension of
Γ iff S = U→AFRA where U is a D-preferred extension of Γ.
Proof. ⇒. If S is a preferred extension, then by Lemma 4 it is also a complete
extension, therefore by Proposition 6 S = U→AFRA where U is a D-complete
extension of Γ. Assume by contradiction that U is not a D-preferred extension
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of Γ: then there is a D-preferred extension (which is also a complete extension)
U ′ ⊆ A such that U ( U ′, entailing by Lemma 8(2) that U→AFRA ( U ′→AFRA.
Furthermore, Proposition 6 entails that U ′→AFRA is a complete extension, and
in particular an admissible set: but this contradicts the fact that U→AFRA = S
is a preferred extension.
⇐. If U is a D-preferred extension of Γ it is in particular a D-complete exten-
sion, therefore Proposition 6 entails that S = U→AFRA is a complete extension
of Γ. Assuming by contradiction that it is not maximal, by Theorem 2 and
Lemma 4 there is a complete extension S ′ such that S ( S ′, and by Proposition
6 it turns out that S ′ = U ′→AFRA where U ′ is a D-complete extension of Γ.
However, S ( S ′ entails by Lemma 8(2) that U ( U ′, contradicting the fact
that U is a D-preferred extension of Γ.
Proposition 8. Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AF and let S be the grounded extension
of Γ. Then, S = U→AFRA where U is the D-grounded extension of Γ.
Proof. Since S is by definition a complete extension, by Proposition 6 it is
the case that S = U→AFRA with U a D-complete extension of Γ. Assume by
contradiction that U is not the least D-complete extension. Then, letting U ′
the D-grounded extension of Γ, we have U ′ ( U which by Lemma 8(2) entails
that U ′→AFRA ( U→AFRA, where U ′→AFRA is by Proposition 6 a complete
extension of Γ: but this contradicts the fact that S = U→AFRA is the least
complete extension of Γ.
Proposition 9. Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AF . Then, S is a stable extension of Γ
iff S = U→AFRA where U is a D-stable extension of Γ.
Proof. ⇒. If S is a stable extension, then by Lemma 5 it is also a preferred
and thus a complete extension, therefore by Proposition 6 it is the case that
S = U→AFRA where U is a D-complete extension of Γ and in particular a
conflict-free set. To see that U is a D-stable extension of Γ, consider a generic
A ∈ A, A /∈ U . By definition of U→AFRA it must be the case that A /∈ U→AFRA,
thus since S is a stable extension ∃α ∈ U→AFRA such that α →R A. The
conclusion follows from the fact that, by definition of U→AFRA, src(α) ∈ U ,
and (src(α), A) ∈→.
⇐. Since U is a D-stable extension of Γ and thus a D-complete extension,
by Proposition 6 it holds that S = U→AFRA is a complete extension and thus a
conflict-free set of Γ. Let V be a generic element not belonging to S. If V ∈ A
then by definition of U→AFRA it is the case that V /∈ U , thus V ∈ UD+ since U
is a D-stable extension. If V ∈ R then by definition of U→AFRA it holds that
src(V ) /∈ U , thus again src(V ) ∈ UD+. In any case, ∃α with src(α) ∈ U such
that α →R V , and the conclusion follows from the fact that, by definition of
U→AFRA, α ∈ S.
The relationships among D-preferred and preferred extensions, D-stable and
stable extensions, and D-grounded and grounded extensions can be easily iden-
tified in Example 3.
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Example 3 (continued). {A,D} and {B,D} are both D-preferred and D-stable
extensions of Γ, while {A,D, α, γ, ζ} and {B,D, β, δ, ζ} are, correspondingly,
both stable and preferred extensions as defined in AFRA. The D-grounded
extension of Γ is ∅ and coincides with the grounded extension as defined in
AFRA (note that ∅→AFRA = ∅).
The bijective correspondence also holds for semi-stable semantics. To show
this we have to first prove a property concerning the relationship between the
→ AFRA operator and the range of a set.
Lemma 9. Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AF and U ⊆ A a set of arguments. Then,
range(U→AFRA) = (Drange(U))→AFRA.
Proof. By definition range(U→AFRA) = U→AFRA ∪ {V ∈ A ∪ R | ∃α ∈
U→AFRA : α →R V }, i.e. U→AFRA ∪ {A ∈ A | ∃α ∈ U→AFRA : α →R
A} ∪ {β ∈ R | ∃α ∈ U→AFRA : α →R β}, which, taking into account that an
attack α ∈ U→AFRA iff src(α) ∈ U , is in turn equal to U→AFRA ∪ UD+ ∪ {β ∈
R | ∃α ∈ U→AFRA : α →R β}. Since Γ is an AF , α →R β with β ∈ R
can only hold by indirect defeat, thus range(U→AFRA) can be expressed as
U→AFRA ∪ UD+ ∪ {β ∈ R | src(β) ∈ UD+}, i.e. U→AFRA ∪ (UD+)
→AFRA
.
Now, by Lemma 8(3) the last expression is equal to (U ∪ UD+)
→AFRA
, i.e.
(Drange(U))→AFRA.
Proposition 10. Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AF . Then, S is a semi-stable extension
of Γ iff S = U→AFRA where U is a D-semi-stable extension of Γ.
Proof. ⇒. Since S is a semi-stable extension of Γ, it is by definition also a
complete extension, therefore by Proposition 6 it is the case that S = U→AFRA
where U ⊆ A is a D-complete extension of Γ. Assume by contradiction that
U is not a D-semi-stable extension: then, there is a D-complete extension U ′
of Γ, U ′ ⊆ A, such that Drange(U) ( Drange(U ′), and letting S ′ ≡ U ′→AFRA
yields S ′ a complete extension of Γ by Proposition 6. However, Drange(U) (
Drange(U ′) entails by Lemma 8(2) that (Drange(U))→AFRA ( (Drange(U ′))→AFRA,
which according to Lemma 9 is equivalent to range(S) ( range(S ′), contradict-
ing the fact that S is a semi-stable extension of Γ.
⇐. Since U is a D-complete extension of Γ, by Proposition 6 it holds that
S = U→AFRA is a complete extension of Γ. Assume by contradiction that it
is not semi-stable: then, there is a complete extension S ′ ⊆ (A ∪ R) such that
range(S) ( range(S ′), where according to Proposition 6 it is the case that S ′ =
U ′→AFRA with U ′ ⊆ A a D-complete extension of Γ. However, applying Lemma
9 to range(S) ( range(S ′) yields (Drange(U))→AFRA ( (Drange(U ′))→AFRA,
which by Lemma 8(2) holds iff Drange(U) ( Drange(U ′), contradicting the fact
that U is a D-semi-stable extension of Γ.
In order to exemplify the relationship between D-semi-stable and semi-stable
extensions, let us consider again Example 3.
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Example 3 (continued). The D-semi-stable extensions of Γ are {A,D} and
{B,D}, while {A,D, α, γ, ζ} and {B,D, β, δ, ζ} are, correspondingly, its semi-
stable extensions.
We finally provide the correspondence result for ideal semantics.
Proposition 11. Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AF and let S be the ideal extension of
Γ. Then, S = U→AFRA where U is the D-ideal extension of Γ.
Proof. According to Lemma 6 S is a complete extension of Γ, therefore, by
Proposition 6, S = U→AFRA where U is a D-complete extension of Γ (thus in
particular D-admissible). By Proposition 7, ∀ E with E a D-preferred extension
of Γ E→AFRA is a preferred extension, thus by definition of ideal extension
S = U→AFRA ⊆ E→AFRA, which by Lemma 8(1) yields U ⊆ E . To show that
U is the D-ideal extension, we have to prove that U is the maximal subset of
A satisfying the latter condition. Assume by contradiction that this is not the
case: then, there is a set U ′ ⊆ A such that U ( U ′ and U ′ is a D-complete
extension contained in all the D-preferred extensions of Γ. By Lemma 8(2),
S = U→AFRA ( U ′→AFRA, where, according to Proposition 6, U ′→AFRA is
a complete extension of Γ, thus admissible. Moreover, by Proposition 7 for
any preferred extension Π of Γ Π = E→AFRA with E a D-preferred extension
of Γ, and since U ′ ⊆ E according to Lemma 8(1) we have that U ′→AFRA ⊆
E→AFRA = Π. Summing up, there is an admissible set, namely U ′→AFRA,
which is contained in all preferred extensions of Γ and such that S ( U ′→AFRA:
but this contradicts the fact that S is the ideal extension of Γ.
Example 3 (continued). The D-ideal extension of Γ is {D}, while {D, ζ} is,
correspondingly, its ideal extension.
7. Expressing AFRA as an AF
We consider now the issue of expressing an AFRA in terms of a traditional
AF and drawing the relevant correspondences concerning the notions introduced
in Sections 4 and 5. This kind of correspondence provides a very useful basis
for further investigations as it allows one to reuse or adapt, in the context of
AFRA, the large corpus of theoretical results available in Dung’s framework, in
particular as far as computational complexity is concerned.
Definition 19. Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 be an AFRA, the corresponding AF ΓAF =
〈A˜, R˜〉 is defined as follows:
• A˜ = A ∪R;
• R˜ = {(V ,W )|V ,W ∈ A ∪R and V →R W }.
In words, both arguments and attacks of the original AFRA Γ become ar-
guments of its corresponding AF -version ΓAF , while the defeat relations in AF
correspond to all direct and indirect defeats in the original AFRA. We can now
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examine the relationships between the relevant notions in Γ and ΓAF showing
that they are all bijections as desirable.
Proposition 12. Let Γ = 〈A,R〉 an AFRA and ΓAF = 〈A˜, R˜〉 its correspond-
ing AF , S ⊆ A ∪R and A ∈ A ∪R:
1. S is a conflict–free set for Γ iff S is a D-conflict-free set for ΓAF ;
2. A is acceptable w.r.t. S ⊆ A ∪ R in Γ iff A is D-acceptable w.r.t. S in
ΓAF ;
3. S is an admissible set for Γ iff S is a D-admissible set for ΓAF ;
4. S is a preferred extension for Γ iff S is a D-preferred extension for ΓAF ;
5. S is a stable extension for Γ iff S is a D-stable extension for ΓAF ;
6. S is a complete extension for Γ iff S is a D-complete extension for ΓAF ;
7. S is the grounded extension for Γ iff S is the D-grounded extension for
ΓAF ;
8. S is a semi-stable extension for Γ iff S is a D-semi-stable extension for
ΓAF ;
9. S is the ideal extension for Γ iff S is the D-ideal extension for ΓAF .
Proof.
1. The conclusion follows directly from Definition 19, taking into account
Definitions 1 and 7.
2. ⇒. Let A ∈ A ∪ R be acceptable w.r.t. S ⊆ A ∪ R in Γ and suppose
A is not D-acceptable w.r.t. S in ΓAF . So, there exists B ∈ A˜ = A ∪ R
s.t. (B,A ) ∈ R˜ and @C ∈ S s.t. (C ,B) ∈ R˜. From Definition 19,
(B,A ) ∈ R˜ iff B →R A and (C ,B) ∈ R˜ iff C →R B. Then ∃B ∈ A∪R
s.t. B →R A and @C ∈ S s.t. C →R B. Therefore A is not acceptable
w.r.t. S in Γ. Contradiction.
⇐. Follows the same reasoning line with obvious modifications.
3. Follows directly from 1 and 2.
4. It follows directly from 3 since both in AFRA (Definition 13) and in AF
(Definition 2) preferred (D-preferred) extensions are defined as maximal
w.r.t. set inclusion admissible (D-admissible) sets.
5. From 1 conflict-free sets are in correspondence between Γ and ΓAF . From
Definition 19, it is easy to see that if ∀A ∈ A ∪ R,A /∈ S, ∃B ∈ S s.t.
B →R A (Definition 14) then also ∀A ∈ A˜ \ S, ∃B ∈ S s.t. (B,A) ∈→
(Definition 1) and viceversa.
6. From 2 it follows that the characteristic function FΓ of Γ is equal to the
D-characteristic function FΓAF of its corresponding AF ΓAF . Then the
conclusion follows from 3, taking into account Definitions 11 and 2.
7. It follows from 6 as the grounded extension is the least complete (D-
complete) extension both in AFRA (Lemma 3) and in AF (Definition
2).
8. It follows from 6, taking into account Definitions 16 and 2 and noting that,
in virtue of Definition 19, the range of a set S in AFRA (Definition 15)
is equal to the D-range of S in ΓAF (Definition 1).
9. It follows directly from 3 and 4.
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8. Comparison with related works
8.1. The Extended Argumentation Framework
In recent years a generalization of Dung’s framework to encompass attacks to
attacks has been proposed in [9, 11], called Extended Argumentation Framework
(EAF ). This approach is motivated by the need to express preferences between
arguments and supports a very interesting form of meta-level argumentation
about the values that arguments promote. In EAF a limited notion of attacks
to attacks is encompassed: only attacks whose target is an argument can be
attacked, while attacks whose target is another attack can not be attacked in
turn. In short, only one level of attacks to attacks is allowed. Referring to
Figure 1, only the attack originated from P can be represented, while the one
originated from N can not.
We recall briefly the main definitions of EAF formalism.
Definition 20. An Extended Argumentation Framework (EAF ) is a tuple
〈Args,R,D〉 s.t. Args is a set of arguments, and:
• R ⊆ Args×Args;
• D ⊆ Args×R;
• if (X, (Y, Z)), (X ′, (Z, Y )) ∈ D then (X,X ′), (X ′, X) ∈ R.
Definition 21. Let 〈Args,R,D〉 be an EAF and S ⊆ Args. Then
• A defeatS B iff (A,B) ∈ R and @C ∈ S s.t. (C, (A,B)) ∈ D. We write
A→S B to denote that A defeatS B, and A9S B to denote that A does
not defeatS B;
• S is conflict-free iff ∀A,B ∈ S: if (A,B) ∈ R, then (B,A) /∈ R and ∃C ∈ S
s.t. (C, (A,B)) ∈ D;
• RS = {X1 →S Y1, . . . , Xn →S Yn} is a reinstatement set for C →S B iff:
1. C →S B ∈ RS ,
2. for i = 1 . . . n,Xi ∈ S,
3. ∀X →S Y ∈ RS , ∀Y ′ s.t. (Y ′, (X,Y )) ∈ D, there is a X ′ →S Y ′ ∈
RS .
• A ∈ Args is acceptable w.r.t. S, iff ∀B s.t. B →S A, there is a C ∈ S s.t.
C →S B and there is a reinstatement set for C →S B.
Semantics notions for EAF paralleling Dung’s ones are proposed in [11].
Definition 22. Let S be a conflict-free subset of Args in 〈Args,R,D〉. Then:
• S is an admissible extension iff every argument in S is acceptable w.r.t.
S.
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• S is a preferred extension iff S is a set inclusion maximal admissible ex-
tension.
• S is a complete extension iff each argument which is acceptable w.r.t. S
is in S.
• S is a stable extension iff ∀B /∈ S, ∃A ∈ S s.t. A defeatS B.
Differently from the case ofAF , in EAF the characteristic function is defined
on conflict-free sets only and is used to define grounded semantics.
Definition 23. Let Λ = 〈Args,R,D〉 be an EAF , S ⊆ Args, and 2ArgsC
denote the set of all conflict-free subset of Args. The characteristic function
FΛ : 2
ArgsC 7→ 2Args is defined as FΛ(S) = {A|A is acceptable w.r.t. S}.
In EAF the grounded semantics is defined only for finitary EAF s.
Definition 24. 〈Args,R,D〉 is finitary iff ∀A ∈ Args, the set {B|(B,A) ∈ R}
is finite, and ∀(A,B) ∈ R, the set {C|(C, (A,B)) ∈ D} is finite.
Definition 25. Let Λ be a finitary EAF and F 0Λ = ∅, F
i+1
Λ = FΛ(F
i
Λ). Then⋃∞
i=0(F
i
Λ) is the grounded extension of Λ.
It is possible to draw a direct correspondence from EAF to AFRA.
Definition 26 (AFRA-EAF correspondence). For any EAF Λ = 〈Args,R,D〉
we define the corresponding AFRA ΛR = 〈Args,R ∪D〉.
Apart from this formal correspondence at the definition level, four main
points are worth remarking to compare EAF and AFRA.
First, as already remarked, EAF encompasses only attacks to attacks be-
tween arguments rather than the general issue of making any attack defeasible.
In [20] an extension of EAF (called EAF+) has been devised which allows for
recursive attacks, while attempting to follow as close as possible the original
EAF definitions: it was shown that the AFRA formalism is able to cover also
EAF+.
A second issue concerns the notion of conflict-free set given in Definition 21
and a constraint on the attack relation in Definition 20. Consider the following
simple example.
Example 4. Let Λ = 〈Args,R,D〉 s.t. Args = {A,B,C}, R = {(A,B)},
D = {(C, (A,B))}. Then, {A,B,C} is a conflict-free set.
Let us add now the relation (B,A) in R.
Example 5. Let Λ = 〈Args,R,D〉 s.t. Args = {A,B,C}, R = {(A,B), (B,A)},
D = {(C, (A,B))}. Then, {A,B,C} is not a conflict-free set.
Suppose then that there is an argument C′ which attacks the attack (B,A)
but it is not the case that C and C′ attack each other (this situation is illus-
trated in Figure 6). Note that the third requirement of Definition 20 is violated,
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therefore this case is not compatible with the EAF definition. While this re-
striction is justified in the context of preference modelling, where EAF has been
conceived, it may turn out a limitation in other areas. Note anyway that even
if this constraint was relaxed, by Definition 21 the set S = {A,B,C,C′} would
not be conflict-free due to the mutual attack between A and B. However, co-
herently with other situations, S should be conflict-free since no argument in S
defeatS another element in S.
The situation shown in Figure 6 can be directly encompassed in AFRA
where, in particular, the set {A,B,C,C′, γ, δ} is conflict-free.
Figure 6: A situation forbidden in EAF .
The third issue concerns the fact that the EAF characteristic function is not
monotonic in general, while it is monotonic in the special cases4 of Hierarchical
Extended Argumentation Framework (HEAF ), and Preference Symmetric Ex-
tended Argumentation Framework (psEAF ). In the HEAF the sets Args and
R are partitioned in different levels which are ordered: any attack to attack can
only start from a higher level than the one which contains the attacked attack.
In the psEAF only attacks between symmetrically attacking arguments can be
attacked by arguments expressing preferences.
These limitations do not apply to AFRA where (as in AF ) the characteristic
function is monotonic (Proposition 3), ensuring further desirable properties at
the semantics level.
The fourth point regards the fact that, as remarked in [11], in general it
does not hold that the grounded extension is the least complete extension: as a
consequence, it is not guaranteed to be included in any complete extension nor,
in particular, in any preferred extension.
Example 6. (From [11]). Consider Λ = 〈Args,R,D〉 s.t. Args = {A,B,C},
R = {(B,A), (C,B)}, D = {(B, (C,B))}. The “self-reinstating argument” B is
overlooked by Definition 25: F 1Λ = {C}, F
2
Λ = {C,A}, F
3
Λ = {C,A} leading to
the inclusion of A in the grounded extension {C,A}. Definition 22 gives rise to
4The notions of HEAF and psEAF and the relevant results are provided in [11].
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a different scenario where {C}, {C,A} and {C,B} are admissible, and {C,A},
{C,B} are the preferred extensions. Hence, only C is included in all preferred
estensions while A is not.
Figure 7: Example about the relation between grounded and preferred semantics in EAF .
Consider instead the example of Figure 7 as formalized in AFRA, i.e. Γ =
〈A,R〉 s.t. A = {A,B,C} and R = {α, β, γ}, where α = (B,A), β = (C,B),
and γ = (B, (C,B)). There are two preferred extensions, namely P1(Γ) =
{C,B, γ, α} and P2(Γ) = {C,A, β}, while the grounded extension is {C}.
Therefore, the grounded semantics of EAF is not in correspondence with
the grounded semantics of AFRA, and a “classical” relation between semantics
notions does not hold in EAF .
8.2. Higher Order Argumentation Framework
In the context of reasoning about coalitions, a formalism encompassing at-
tacks to attacks called Higher Order Argumentation Framework (HOAF) has
been considered [15, 16].
We recall literally the rather articulated definition of HOAF from [16].
Definition 27. A Higher Order Argumentation Framework (HOAF) is a tuple
〈AC ,A, not,A#,#〉 where AC is a set of coalition arguments, A is a set of
arguments such that |A| = |AC |, not is a bijection from AC to A, A# is a
set of arguments that coalitions attacks attack each other, and # ⊆ (AC ×
A) ∪ (A × A#) ∪ (A# × AC) ∪ (A# × A#) is a binary relation on the set
of arguments such that for a ∈ AC and b ∈ A we have a#b if and only if
b = not(a), and for each a ∈ A#, there is precisely one b ∈ A such that b#a
and precisely one c ∈ AC ∪ A# such that a#c. A higher order argumentation
framework 〈AC ,A, not,A#,#〉 represents 〈A,→〉 if and only if A = AC ∪ A ∪
A#. The extensions of 〈AC ,A, not,A#,#〉 are the extensions of the represented
argumentation framework.
In HOAF attacks to attacks are not explicitly represented. In fact, the attack
relation # is not recursive and relates the elements of three distinct sets, namely
AC , A, and A#. The intuitive meaning of these three sets can be appreciated by
regarding a HOAF as the result of a translation of an argumentation framework
with recursive attacks into an AF 5, where AC represents the set of arguments
and A# the set of attacks. In fact for each element A of AC a corresponding
element not(A) representing “non acceptance” of A is present inA. It is assumed
5Note that this kind of representation was also introduced in [10] as an approach to rewrite
an EAF as a traditional AF .
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that A attacks not(A), i.e. (A, not(A)) ∈ #, but not viceversa. Elements of
A# represent attacks of the original argumentation framework with recursive
attacks: each of these attacks has a source argument belonging to AC and a
target which is either an argument in AC or another attack in A#. Then:
• for each element A of AC , it is assumed that not(A) attacks in HOAF
(through #) all elements of A# whose source is A;
• each element of A# attacks in HOAF (through #) its target, either be-
longing to AC (if it is an argument) or to A# (if it is another attack).
Finally, by simply treating AC ∪ A ∪A# as an undistinguished set of argu-
ments, ignoring the not relation and using # as an attack relation, a HOAF can
be regarded as a traditional AF and the relevant semantics notions are defined.
It emerges from the above discussion that, given a HOAF, a corresponding
AFRA can be defined by considering only elements of AC as arguments and
applying a sort of inversion of the implicit translation procedure, as proposed
in Definition 28.
Definition 28. For any Υ = 〈AC ,A, not,A#,#〉 we define the corresponding
AFRA ΥR = 〈AC ,R〉 s.t. (a,V ) ∈ R if and only if (a,V ) represents (b, c) ∈ #.
(a,V ) ∈ R is said to represent (b, c) ∈ # if either of the following conditions
holds:
• b ∈ A#, (not(A), b) ∈ #, c ∈ AC and V = c;
• b ∈ A#, (not(A), b) ∈ #, c ∈ A# and ∃(c, d) ∈ # such that V represents
(c, d).
From Definition 28 it emerges that any HOAF can be reduced to an AFRA
while the (implicit) translation algorithm previously described can be used to
translate an AFRA into a HOAF. Hence the two formalisms feature the same
expressiveness, AFRA providing however a simpler and cleaner representation
and not requiring in particular the use of the additional “not” arguments. Se-
mantics notions are directly introduced in the AFRA formalism and shown to
satify desirable properties in relation to the representation of attacks to attacks
while semantics notions in HOAF are indirectly introduced with reference to
a “represented AF”, and are not accompanied by such an analysis nor by the
statement of reference requirements.
To exemplify, let us consider the Bob’s last minute dilemma formalised by
an HOAF and shown in Figure 8.
Example 7. Let 〈AC ,A, not,A#,#〉 be an Higher Order Argumentation Frame-
work, where AC = {A, N, P, C, G}, A = {not(A), not(N), not(P ), not(C),
not(G)}, A# = {C −G, G−C, P − (C −G), N − (P − (C −G)), A−N} and
# = {(A, not(A)), (not(A), A−N), (A−N,N), (N,not(N)), (not(N), N−(P −
(C−G))), (N−(P −(C−G)), P −(C−G)), (P, not(P )), (not(P ), P −(C−G)),
(P − (C − G), C − G), (C, not(C)), (not(C), C − G), (C − G,G), (G,not(G)),
(not(G), G − C), (G− C,C)}.
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The only complete, grounded, preferred, stable, semi-stable, ideal extension,
according with Definition 27 is {A, P, G, not(N), not(C), A−N, P − (C −G),
G− C}.
Figure 8: Bob’s last minute dilemma formalised by a HOAF.
Further investigation of the relations between HOAF and AFRA is an in-
teresting direction of future work.
9. Conclusion and future works
AFRA is a novel abstract argumentation formalism encompassing unlimited
attacks to attacks in a quite simple formal setting and satisfying a set of basic
requirements mainly concerning relationships with Dung’s original AF . While
direct correspondences between AFRA and AF are achieved at several levels,
as shown in the paper, we remark that AFRA represents a significant concep-
tual advancement by regarding attacks as defeasible entities themselves. This
enables the representation of situations where some kind of reasoning about at-
tacks is carried out, whose usefulness is suggested by several recent works in the
literature. In particular, meta-argumentation [21, 22] represents a promising
research area where defeasibility of attacks may play a significant role as a use-
ful modelling tool. Currently a full-fledged formalization of reasoning contexts
where recursive attacks are required can be regarded as an important future re-
search task: apart the issue of meta-argumentation mentioned above, a detailed
analysis has been carried out up to now only for the case of reasoning about
preferences in [11] where just one level of recursion is considered.
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Independently of the actual representation needs of specific reasoning con-
texts, it can be remarked that AFRA, while pursuing a high generality in the
definition of recursive attacks, achieves at the same time the goal of providing
a simpler formalism than other (even less expressive) proposals. In fact other
approaches to represent attacks to attacks in the literature appear to resort to
somewhat more complicated formal structures and their semantics properties
are still to be analyzed in detail and/or reveal a looser correspondence with
Dung’s ones, as discussed in Section 8. AFRA appears anyway to be able to
encompass these formalisms while, by explicit design choice, it does not cover
more radical departures from Dung framework, where the notion of recursive
attacks is combined with those of argument strength or of joint and disjunc-
tive attack [17, 23, 24]. Analyzing their relationships with AFRA represents an
interesting direction of future work.
As to actual implementation in software tools, AFRA has recently been in-
cluded in ASPARTIX6, a software tool for implementing argumentation frame-
works using Answer Set Programming. As stated in [25, 26] this approach uses
a fixed logic program which is capable of computing the different forms of ex-
tension from a given framework which is given as input. Due to this simple
architecture, the system is easily extensible and suitable for rapid prototyping.
This shows that, by its simplicity, the AFRA formalism lends itself to rather
straightforward implementation. As to computational complexity, the results
in Sections 6 and 7 suggest that the many already known results for AF can be
applied to AFRA too.
On the application side, we have mentioned in the paper several contexts
where recursive attacks can be useful. The area of modelling articulated decision
processes involving reasoning with values is particularly interesting as it has
been the subject of detailed analysis leading to the proposal of the Value-Based
Argumentation Framework (V AF ) [4, 27]. From this perspective an analysis of
the relationships between AFRA and V AF provides a significant direction of
future work: some preliminary results are provided in [28].
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